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COMMENTS
INSURANCE-ACCIDENT INSURER'S LIABILITY FOR MORE
THAN FACE AMOUNT OF POLICY
Under certain conditions an insurance company may be liable
to the insured for an amount in excess of the limit on the face of
the accident policy. This question was decided in favor of the insured
in a recent Ohio Case.'
The liability of the insurance company to the insured was based
on a certain type of "no action" clause in the policy. This type of
clause is written into many liability and casualty policies, and reserves
to the insurance company the exclusive right to clefend any action,
or settle any claim, which may be brought against the insured by an
injured party.
As a result of such clauses courts have held that a definite rela-
tionship arises between the insurance company and the insured. The
problem is of importance especially where a settlement is offered by
the injured party. To what extent does the insurance company have
the duty to settle? When may it decide to contest, even though ulti-
mately the judgment may be far in excess of the policy limits?
In the case referred to, an Ohio court held the insurer may be
liable for a negligent failure to settle a claim for an amount within
the limits of the policy and may be liable for a total udgment against
the assured. The case was remanded for jury action on the question
of negligence and good faith.2
The majority of courts have stated that the liability of an insurer
is not on an implied contract, but rather is based on the negligence
or bad faith of the insurer in its conduct of the negotiations in the
case. No duty is imposed on the insurer by the contract to settle a
claim for an amount within the policy. But where the insurer is
guilty of fraud or bad faith, it may be held liable in tort for re-
fusing to settle, to the extent of any excess of a judgment recovered
against the insured over the amount payable by the terms of the
policy.3 The Oklahoma Court, holding the basis of the liability to be
' The defendant insurance company decided not to settle the action for $5,500
against the insured within the policy limits of $10,000 unless the insured con-
tributed $1,200. Both parties realized the seriousness of the injury and that
very likely judgment would be in excess of $10,000. The final judgment against
the insured was $11,600. Held-The insurance company owes the duty of good
faith in conducting its assured's defense and negotiations for settlement of
claims made against such assured that come within the terms of a policy of
insurance issued by the insurer to the insured.
A petition claiming allegations based on bad faith or negligence in the per-
formance of a contract and sounding in tort is sufficient and not demurrable.
The record discloses substantial evidence in support of the issues presented
by the pleading. The issues of fact must be submitted to the jury. J. Spang
Baking Co. v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., Court of Appeals, Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, 68 N.E. (2d) 122 (1946).
2 J. Spang Baking Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., supra.
1Lanferman v. Maryland Casualty Co., 222 Wis. 406, 267 N. W. 300 (1936).
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indemnity, states that the relationship between the parties imposes
on the insurer a duty to exercise skill, care, and good faith to the
end of saving the insured harmless, and this contemplated by the
contract.
4
A division of opinion exists in the various courts as to whether
a showing of mere negligence is sufficient for recovery by the insured,5
or whether the insured must show that the insurance company acted
in bad faith in refusing settlement.6 The latter decisions require the
proof offered by the insured to be more than a mere preponderance
of the evidence, and necessitate clear and satisfactory proof of the
bad faith of the insurer.
The Wisconsin Court has held that the insured must prove bad
faith to recover. The difficulties involved in defining the insurer's
duty led to the well written decision, on rehearing, in Hilker v. Western
Automobile Insurance Co." In the original case the court stated the
insurance company ought to be held to that degree of care and dili-
gence which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the
management of his own business. This, a definition apparently founded
upon negligence as a basis of recovery, was recast by the court on
rehearing :s
"* * * Where an injury occurs for which a recovery may
be had in a sum exceeding the amount of the insurance, * * *
a duty on the part of the insurer to the insured arises. It
arises because the insured * * * has contracted with the insurer
that it shall have the exclusive right to settle or compromise
the claim, to conduct the defense, * * * It is a right to be exer-
cised by the insurer in its own interest.
"It is the right of the insurer to exercise its own judg-
ment upon the question of whether the claim should be settled
or contested. But because it has taken over this duty, and
because the contract prohibits the insured from settling * * *
or interfering * * * its exercise of this right should be accom-
panied by considerations of good faith. Its decision not to
settle should be an honest decision. * * * If upon such con-
sideration it decides that its interest will be better promoted
by contesting than by settling the claim, insured must abide
by whatever consequences flow from that decision. * * * In
order that it be honest and intelligent it must be based upon
a knowledge of the facts and circumstances upon which liability
is predicated, and upon a knowledge of the nature of the in-
juries so far as they reasonably can be ascertained. * * *
4 Boling v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 Pac. 2d 916 (1935).
5 Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident Fire & Life Co. 79 N.H. 186, 106 Atl. 604.6New Orleans R. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 114 La. 154, 38 So. 89, 1 LRA
562; Wis. Zinc Co. v. Fidelity Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N W 1801; Auerback v.
Maryland Casualty Co. 236 N.Y. 247.7 Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235 N W 413, 231 N W 257
(1931).9Hilker v. Western Auto Ins. Co., supra.
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"We go only so far as to say that it should exercise reason-
able diligence * * * which means such diligence as the great
majority of persons use in same or similar circumstances."
Thus it appears that the insurer, although liable only if its ac-
tions are in bad faith, may be found guilty of bad faith where the
conduct of its investigation, as in the case above quoted, was so
negligent as to clearly and obviously amount to a breach of the duty
of ordinary care.9
The decision in the Hilker case has been approved in a later Wis-
consin Case,10 holding the test is not whether the defendant acted
negligently, but whether it acted in good faith toward the plaintiff.
Bad faith is an element of fraud, and the evdience to sustain a
finding thereof must be clear, satisfactory and convincing.
It appears from the Berk case that it is not bad faith where
counsel for the insurer refuse settlement under a bona fide belief
that they might defeat the action, or at least can keep the verdict
within the policy limits.1' Although the insurer may consult what it
deems to be its own interests, it cannot refuse to settle in a case
where the probable judgment will be a loss to both the insured and
itself.12
But the very fact that the company could have settled for a
smallei" sum than the ultimate judgment may be persuasive evidence
of good faith. For an insurance company will likely settle for a
smaller sum unless it decides the claim can be defeated completely.
13
9 The jury found bad faith and court held evidence sustained the verdict. The
injured girl was taken to the hospital by a witness and the insurer made no
effort to inquire at the hospital as to his name or to interview him. The insurer
did not find and interview known eye witnesses. Such witnesses' testimony
was a major item of proof in plaintiff's case in Stoffle v. Hinkler, 189 Wis.
414, 418 N W 185.
"The insurer made an inadequate, a careless if not shiftless, investigation
of the facts and was never at any time in position to exercise a sound or good
faith judgment."
Hilker v. Western Auto Ins. Co., supra.
10 Berk v. Milwaukee Auto Insurance Co. 245 Wis. 597, (1944).
liWakefiell v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N W 643. Quoted by
Wisconsin Court in Berk v. Milwaukee Auto Insurance Co., supra. at page 614.
12 "While the defendant had the right to consult what it deemed to be its own
interest in making a settlement it could not abuse the power vested in it and
recklessly and contumaciously refuse, to settle if it was apparent that in all
reasonable probability its conduct would not only result in damages to the plain-
tiff but also in loss to itself. Neither could it exercise the right conferred on
it for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud on the plaintiff." Wisconsin Zinc
Co. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 162 Wis. 39, 155 N W 1081 (1916).
13 "There is some evidence that the Kuhle Case could have been settled for
either $750 or $1500 before the trial. The fact that the defendant declined
such offers and contested the action, when it could have settled at either figure,
appears to be persuasive evidence of the good faith of the defendant." Berk v.
Milwaukee Auto Insurance Co. 245 Wis. 597, at 608, supra 10.
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The decision not to settle must be made in good faith and on reason-
able ground for the belief "that an excessive amount is demanded
for a settlement".1
4
The Wisconsin decisions seem to hold that where a decision to
contest is made honestly in the hope of a lesser judgment, even
it may not be in the very best interest of the insured, it is a decision
made in good faith. The language of a Vermont case' 5 restricts the
insurer more closely and forbids the insurer to entirely disregard the
interests of the insured in making its decision. While the policy
necessitating a showing of bad faith is just, where the offer of settle-
ment is close to the limits of the policy the decision of the insurer
to contest should be scrutinized very closely for evidence of total
disregard of the insured's interest. For, as the Oklahoma Court has
said, the contract is one to hold the insured harmless as result of
any action brought against him up to a certain policy limit. It would
seem that, as between the two parties to the insurance contract, the
insured's interest ought to have priority.
A mere error of judgment as to liability under the law, if made
honestly, is not bad faith. But the insurer should not be absolved
of liability when it acts upon what it considers to be its own interest,
unless it also appears that it considered and dealt fairly with the
interest of the insured.
RALPH J. STRANDBERG
14 Mendota Electric Co. v. N. Y. Indemnity Co., 169 Minn. 377, 211 N W 317
(1926).
15 "If in what it did and refused to do it acted honestly and according to its bestjudgment this suit must fail. If on the contrary it used its authority . . .to
save itself from as much of the loss as possible in disregard of the plaintiff's
rights, consciously risking loss to the plaintiff to save loss to itself, the suit
must succeed for that would be bad faith.
"As applied to this case bad faith on the part of the defendant would be the
intentional disregard of the financial interests of the plaintiff in the hope of
escaping the full responsibility imposed upon it by its policy." Johnson v.
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 Atl 817 (1938).
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